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Grid operators increasingly have to collaborate with other actors in order to realize smart grid innova-
tions. For routine maintenance, grid operators typically acquire technologies in one-off transactions, but
the innovative nature of smart grid projects may require more collaborate relationships. This paper
studies how a transactional versus relational approach to governing smart grid innovation projects af-
fects incentives for other actors to collaborate. We analyse 34 cases of smart grid innovation projects
based on extensive archival data as well as interviews. We ﬁnd that projects relying on relational gov-
ernance are more likely to provide incentives for collaboration. Especially non-ﬁnancial incentives such
as reputational beneﬁts and shared intellectual property rights are more likely to be found in projects
relying on relational governance. Policy makers that wish to stimulate smart grid innovation projects
should consider stimulating long-term relationships between grid operators and third parties, because
such relationships are more likely to produce incentives for collaboration.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Smart grids are generally seen as important enablers of more
transparent, reliable and sustainable energy supply (Morgan et al.,
2009). Smart grids are changing how grid operators deal with
other actors in the energy industry (Agrell et al., 2013; Giordano
and Fulli, 2012). For regular maintenance of the electricity grid,
grid operators typically purchase technologies and other resources
in one-off transactions. However, smart grid innovation is no
routine activity and requires continuous learning and experi-
mentation (Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006). Therefore, grid op-
erators may have to engage in joint technology development in
long-term relationships rather than one-off transactions. In other
words, grid operators may have to move from transactionalr Ltd. This is an open access article
ver).towards relational governance in their dealing with third parties
(cf., Uzzi, 1997).
Smart grid innovation projects can be framed as collective ac-
tion situations since smart grids cannot be realized by one single
actor (Oliver et al., 1985; Olson, 1971). Grid operators depend on
energy producers, energy providers and technology providers for
access to technologies and other resources. Since smart grid pilots
often take place in a speciﬁc region, regional governments and
citizen associations also need to be involved. Collective action
theory is speciﬁcally useful to understand the position of grid
operators since it deals with issues of governance (Ostrom, 2000;
Salisbury, 1969) as well as how to incentivize collaboration (Olson,
1971). However, collective action theory has not yet been applied
to the case of smart grid innovation projects.
This paper aims to analyse how a transactional versus relational
approach to governing smart grid innovation projects affects in-
centives for other actors to collaborate. We do so through an
embedded case study (Yin, 2003) on the major Dutch gridunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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novation projects in which the grid operator participated (2007–
2013). Our case data is derived from a unique dataset comprising
extensive internal documentation on smart grid innovation pro-
jects. Findings are corroborated through a set of interviews with
project participants. The embedded case study design provides
high internal validity since all embedded cases have similar mar-
ket and institutional conditions.
Smart grids is a termwithout a unique single meaning (Morgan
et al., 2009). According to the European Commission, a smart grid
is ‘an electricity network that can cost-efﬁciently integrate the
behaviour and actions of all users connected to it – generators,
consumers and those that do both – in order to ensure econom-
ically efﬁcient, sustainable power system with low losses and high
levels of quality and security of supply and safety’ (European
Commission, 2011). As such, smart grids contain digital technolo-
gies to mediate communication between electricity providers and
consumers, in order to enable energy savings, increased reliability
and increased efﬁciency of the grid. Smart grids also enable grid
operators to limit the copper lines that need to be installed
through smart planning (Verzijlbergh et al., 2012).
The paper contributes to policy making in the ﬁeld of smart
grids. For policy makers that intend to foster smart grid innova-
tion, the ﬁndings provide important implications on how to shape
government-funded R&D projects in the area of smart grids, and
which incentives for collaboration are used in which types of
governance forms. For grid operators, the paper shows how to
make trade-offs between transactional and relational governance
in their innovation projects with other actors..
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the theo-
retical framework for the study, building on governance as well as
collective action theories. Based on the theory, hypotheses are
developed. Section 3 details the case study method, including the
case selection, data sources and measurement instrument. Next,
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses results and
concludes the paper with recommendations for policy makers as
well as grid operators.2. Background
This section provides a theoretical background on governance
(Section 2.1) as well as collective action theory (Section 2.2). In
Section 2.3, we develop hypotheses that will be tested in the re-
mainder of the paper.
2.1. Transactional and relational governance
Governance has been discussed both from a wide range of
perspectives, ranging from economics to sociology and innovation
management (see for an overview De Reuver, 2009). In economic
literature, especially transaction costs theory deals extensively
with governance. A speciﬁc concern is whether to organize eco-
nomic activities within or between organizations (Hennart, 1993;
Williamson, 1979). In its traditional form, transaction costs theory
distinguishes market and hierarchy governance (Williamson,
1979). Hierarchy governance is used to organize activities within
the organization, using mechanisms such as power and authority
structures. Market governance is used to organize activities with
other organizations, using mechanisms such as price and legal
contracts. The assumption is that economic exchange in the mar-
ket is typically done in one-off transactions in which opportunistic
behaviour has to be countered.
In sociological literature, it is typically argued that transactions
are embedded in social relationships. Relational approaches to
governance took off with the classical work by Granovetter (1985),who argues that most economic models, including transaction
costs theory, tend to underestimate the fact that transactions are
embedded in social networks. As such, the behaviour and out-
comes can only be understood when embeddedness is taken into
account. For instance, Uzzi (1997) ﬁnds that organizations that are
embedded in long-term relationships do not pursue their own
interests in a calculative manner, but rather act trying to beneﬁt
the long-term collaboration. In other words, the long-term relation
is considered more important than the individual transaction.
Such benevolent behaviour may even occur if a relationship is
about to end. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argue that organizations
often take the interest of other organizations into account when
managers feel they are indebted to do so.
Besides these social drivers, another driver for relational gov-
ernance may be that long-term relations create value rather than
pose costs (Tsang, 2000; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). For instance, Dyer
and Singh (1998) argue that long-term relationships may create
beneﬁts that could not be achieved when organizations would act
alone as they require long-term collaboration. In their view, mar-
ket governance could harm these relational rents as they involve
contracting, monitoring, adaptation and renegotiation costs. Or-
ganizations should rather use self-enforced arrangements like ﬁ-
nancial co-investments, goodwill, trust and reputation.
Another driver for relational governance is that organizations
often ﬁnd themselves as being part of a broader network. As Gulati
et al. (2000, p. 203) argue, being embedded in networks leads to
reputational concerns. Not adhering to agreements with partners
can damage the reputation of an organization. Moreover, being
embedded in a broader network makes it easier for trust to de-
velop, to acquire knowledge about capabilities of partners and to
sanction opportunistic behaviour. Jones et al. (1997) advance the
concept of network governance to reﬂect how embeddedness af-
fects governance between organizations. They argue that organi-
zations in network do not need to make legal but social and im-
plicit contracts, which allow more ﬂexibly adapting to changing
circumstances..
ICT innovations like smart grids make it more likely for orga-
nizations to be embedded in networks of relationships. In tradi-
tional manufacturing-oriented industries, economic activities are
typically organized in a linear fashion, see Porter (1985). However,
this assumption does not hold for service industries (Stabell and
Fjeldstad 1998). Moreover, ICT and liberalization of markets has
led to convergence between previously separate industry sectors
as illustrated by Li and Whalley (2002). Consequently, organiza-
tions are increasingly embedded in networks, which make rela-
tional governance more likely to emerge.
Importantly, transactional and relational governance are to be
seen as ideal types. In reality, organizations often use a mix of
governance modes as has been shown by Lowndes and Skelcher
(1998).
2.2. Collective action theory
Collective action theory, ﬁrst developed by Olson (1971), ex-
plains how groups of individuals may collaborate for a common
goal even if the incentives to do so are smaller than not colla-
borating. In other words, the theory seeks to explain the condi-
tions under which individuals, or organizations, collaborate with
each other to accomplish a common goal (Markus et al., 2006). The
theory has been widely applied to study collaboration for a com-
mon goal in different ﬁelds of sociology, politics and management
of natural resources. Recently, collection action has also been
adapted to studying collaboration for innovation projects (e.g., De
Reuver et al., 2015).
Collective action emerges when group members share a com-
mon goal and have strong motives for cooperation (Monge et al.,
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ﬁnding new business opportunities, like being visible in a market
or extending activities to emerging domains (Contractor and Lor-
ange, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1993). Other organizational motives may
include strategic issues, for example status and reputation (Lopes
et al., 2009), and networking issues, for example to enlarge net-
works or explore new cooperation opportunities (Contractor and
Lorange, 1988).
The classical problem of collective action is that ‘rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests’ and they tend to free-ride on contributions of
others (Olson, 1971). Therefore, when it is not possible to exclude
others, rational individuals are better off to beneﬁt from it without
contributing any resources for provision of that. However, if every
individual in a group behaves like that, the collective good will not
be provided and everyone would be damaged (Kollock, 1998). The
free-rider issue, which is an inhibitor, will sabotage the efforts for
collective action in two ways: either everyone would be tempted
to free-ride and behave rationally or would lose motivation to
cooperate because of fear that others might free ride. This will lead
to the ‘start-up dilemma’, i.e. how to start-up cooperation?
As the intrinsic motives for engaging in collective action may
not be sufﬁcient, ‘selective incentives’ may be deployed (Knoke,
1988; Oliver, 1980). Selective incentives can be positive (e.g.
awards or private beneﬁts for those contributing to the common
goal) or negative (e.g. penalties and punishments for those not
contributing) (Oliver, 1980). Positive incentives may be material
(e.g. subsidies, funding) or immaterial (e.g. status, reputation,
support) (Clark and Wilson, 1961).
Typically, deploying selective incentives requires a central au-
thority to impose rewards and punishments (Olson, 1971; Salis-
bury, 1969). Salisbury (1969) deﬁnes leaders as those who invest
capital to create a set of beneﬁts (i.e., selective incentives) for
potential members to join a group. He argues that if the beneﬁts
fail or costs exceed the beneﬁts for both potential members and
leaders, the group will collapse.
2.3. Hypotheses
To conclude this section, we build hypotheses on how trans-
actional versus relational governance affects the selective in-
centives for collective action in smart grid innovation projects.
Consistent with Clark and Wilson (1961), we differentiate ma-
terial and non-material selective incentives for collective action.
Given that transactional governance is based on mechanisms of
price, we hypothesize that ﬁnancial selective incentives are mostly
likely to be present in projects relying on transactional
governance.
H1. : Financial selective incentives are most likely to be found in
projects relying on transactional governance.
As part of the non-material selective incentives, we argue that
reputation-related incentives are important, following Lopes et al.
(2009). Especially as smart grids are an emerging area, having
reputable partners is valuable as an incentive to participate in
projects. As reputation is an important mechanism in embedded
relationships (Gulati et al., 2000), we hypothesize that reputation-
related incentives are most likely to be present in projects relying
on relational governance.
H2. : Reputation-related selective incentives are most likely to be
found in projects relying on relational governance.
We further argue that the technological nature of smart grid
projects implies that access to enabling technologies can be con-
sidered an incentive for collaboration. For instance, access to thecore of the grid, smart meter interfaces or data from the grid can
be an incentive for third parties to collaborate with a grid operator.
Since access to enabling technologies is especially relevant when
persistent over a longer period of time, we hypothesize that re-
lational governance is most likely to produce technology-related
selective incentives.
H3. : Technology-related selective incentives are most likely to be
found in projects relying on relational governance.
Finally, given the innovative nature of smart grid innovation
projects, intellectual property rights (IPR) gained from a project
will be an important incentive for actors to collaborate. When
projects partners become the (partial) owner of IPR produced in a
project, this can be an important incentive to participate. Such
joint IPR will especially arise when technologies are developed
jointly by grid operators and other actors. Therefore, we hy-
pothesize that:
H4. : IPR-related selective incentives are most likely to be found in
projects relying on relational governance.
Hypotheses are visualized in Fig. 1.3. Methodology
To test the hypotheses from Section 2, an embedded multiple
case study is conducted. We analyse the smart grid innovation
project portfolio of Alliander, the largest grid operator in the
Netherlands, distributing electricity to more than 3 million cus-
tomers and gas to more than 2.5 million customers in the Neth-
erlands. Alliander is extensively engaged in smart grid innovation
and hosts a knowledge centre for technical innovations for the
distribution of electricity and gas as well as social innovations
providing customers with better insight in their energy con-
sumption. Alliander is especially suitable for our research purposes
as it has largely relied on transactional governance in the past and
is now slowly moving towards more long-term relations with
other actors in the energy industry and beyond.
We follow an embedded case study design (Yin, 2003), which
implies that multiple cases of smart grid innovation are studied
which are all governed by the same grid operator, Alliander. The
advantage of the embedded case approach is that we can control
for external factors affecting governance and selective incentives,
such as market and institutional conditions. Moreover, by studying
34 cases, we are able to make statistical inferences on the asso-
ciation between governance and selective incentives for collective
action.
We use content analysis as a tool to analyse a rich set of data on
the cases. Case material was sourced from extensive internal
documentation (e.g. progress reports, project management re-
ports) and complemented with a series of interviews with project
participants. Based on the data, two observers ﬁlled out a coding
protocol.
3.1. Background on Alliander
For specifying our measurement instrument and interpreting
the ﬁndings, we ﬁrst explored the context in which Alliander en-
gages in smart grid innovation. We did so through various in-
formal talks with three key informants in Alliander, who are de-
cision makers from asset management, innovation and sub-
contracting departments. Informal talks took place between 2011
and 2013, i.e. both before data collection to specify our measure-
ment instrument and after the data collection for aiding in inter-
preting ﬁndings. We conducted a follow-up interview with the
Fig. 1. Hypotheses.
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uary 2016, allowing a more reﬂective perspective on the observed
period. These informal talks and follow-up interview served to
sketch the context of the cases, and were not used for the actual
data collection.
Strategic drivers to engage in smart grid innovation projects are
diverse, according to our key informants. While the main strategic
goal of grid operators is to achieve operational excellence by re-
ducing costs, innovation and customer intimacy are becoming
increasingly important. However, smart grid innovation may, in
the long run, reduce operational risk, for instance as real-time
information on loads can reduce redundancies in grid planning. As
such, innovation is not only a nice-to-have but also directly con-
tributes to reaching efﬁciency gains in the long run. Another rea-
son to engage in smart grid innovation is from a responsibility and
legitimacy perspective. Due to the separation between grid op-
erations and energy provisioning, grid operators do not have a
direct relation with end-users. However, end-users do have to pay
a mandatory fee for the grid operations, which sometimes raises
legitimacy concerns. A typical pattern is that grid operators try to
sustain their legitimacy by engaging in innovation projects.
According to our key informants, the object of innovation in
smart grid projects ranges from pure technology development
towards testing, demonstration and roll-out, see also Section 3.2.
As such, the most relevant manifestation of transactional versus
relational governance is on how technologies are developed with
third parties. On the extreme ends, technology innovation is either
achieved through subcontracting to third parties in one-off
transactions (i.e. transactional governance) or through long-term
open-ended collaboration projects (i.e. relational governance). In
those open-ended collaboration projects, Alliander attempts to
share gains from innovation projects. For instance, smart grid
projects can lead to less redundancy in grid layouts which imply
less turnover in the future for subcontractors. In these cases, Al-
liander allows subcontractors to increase their margins in order to
compensate for turnover reduction.The cultural and strategic context plays an important role in
how to govern smart grid innovation projects, according to our key
informants. The main performance criteria of a grid operator are
transmission continuity and voltage quality, which form the core
of benchmarks among grid operators in Europe (CEER, 2012).
Consequently, there are strong incentives for the grid operator to
control operational risks in innovation projects. A risk-averse
culture is at odds with the open-ended, non-formalized nature of
relational governance. At the same time, key informants point out
that the risk-averse culture has changed in the past years.
3.2. Cases
We identiﬁed cases of smart grid innovation projects by ex-
ploring internal project management databases as well as inter-
viewing informants within Alliander, see Section 3.2. Initially, we
identiﬁed 124 cases in which Alliander cooperated with external
parties in a project on smart grid innovation. From this initial set,
34 cases were selected that contained sufﬁciently rich information
to analyse governance forms and collective action incentives.
The projects ran between 2007 and 2013. Projects ran between
5 and 69 months, with an average of 23 months. Projects were
generally large with an average budget per project of 6.2 million
euros. Government subsidies were part of the budget for 37% of
the projects, with an average amount of subsidies equaling half a
million euros. Almost half of the projects had a clear regional focus
(47%).
The main focus of the projects was to enable home energy
management or smart meters (33%), local energy production
(12%), energy savings for consumers (9%), energy storage (6%), CO2
reduction (6%), (bio)gas (6%), e-mobility (3%), or the smart grid and
smart cities in general (26%).
The nature of projects was diverse, in terms of technology-or-
ientation and maturity of the solutions. Six projects explicitly aim
at technology development only, for instance exploring and de-
veloping solutions for energy storage, for self-sustaining
Table 1
Interviewees.
Interviewee Role in company Role in analyzed projects
1 Innovation consultant Participated in several smart meter
related projects as advisor
2 Program manager Manages program overseeing multiple
pilot projects on smart grids
3 Senior innovation
manager
Involved in several pilot projects smart
grids
4 Internal consultant reg-
ulatory affairs
Regulatory advisor on several projects
5 Consultant and program
manager
Manages program overseeing innova-
tion projects in Amsterdam area
6 Project manager Involved in projects on gas
transmission
7 Innovation and strategy
consultant
Involved in projects on energy storage
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to the grid. Other examples of technology development are ex-
ploring wireless technologies as a backup communication channel
for smart grids. Five projects aimed at testing technological solu-
tions in practice, for instance a technology for storing locally
produced energy from farmers or a tool for offering dynamic en-
ergy pricing to citizens. In seven projects, readily developed
technological solutions were rolled out in practice. These im-
plementation projects range from simple projects (e.g. rolling out a
smart meter) towards complex integrative projects (e.g. building a
new city district without carbon emissions). At least three projects
were explicitly aiming to improve acceptance from the general
public for smart meters, for instance by offering personal advice
on potential energy savings or even an energy savings contest
among primary school children. In four other projects, the aimwas
to induce behavioural change (i.e. reducing energy consumption)
from citizens or workers, for instance by providing insights into
energy consumption from smart meters.
The grid operator participated in the projects for multiple non-
exclusive goals, according to formal project documentation: de-
veloping strategic relationships (82%), realizing the smart grid
(74%), costs reduction (71%), showcase demonstration (38%), fa-
cilitating transition to sustainable energy production (38%),
learning about smart grid innovations (21%), testing smart meters
in practice (12%), promoting the brand name of the grid operator
(6%), demonstrating societal and regional involvement (3%) and
promotion of smart meters (3%).
On average, 6.6 partners were involved per project, ranging
from two to eighteen partners. Typical roles of project partners are
energy producer such as a power-plant (present in 82% of all
projects), citizen association (76%), energy providers who deliver
energy to end-users (71%), knowledge institutes (59%), govern-
ment agency (44%) and technology providers (32%). In 80% of the
projects, some or all of the partners had already collaborated
earlier.
The data sources provided limited information regarding the
ultimate outcomes of the projects. For 53% of the projects, con-
clusions on the outcomes could not be drawn by the observers
because such information was not available in the project man-
agement databases or it was too early to conclude. 18% of the
projects clearly met the stated objectives. 12% of the projects did
not meet the stated objectives but produced lessons learned,
especially on the feasibility of technological solutions, while an-
other 6% of the projects did not meet the stated objectives due to
conﬂicts between partners. 12% of the projects were terminated
before reaching the end of the projects, for instance because
project partners did no longer wish to participate in the projects.
3.3. Data sources
For each case, three main sources of data were consulted. First,
for factual information on project goals, milestones, involved ex-
ternal partners, involved personnel and starting dates, an internal
knowledge management system was consulted. Second, a rich and
extensive amount of project management information was
sourced from an internal ﬁle sharing database. This database
contained the following types of documents:
– Project initiation documents: Following a formal project man-
agement method, such documents contain a management
summary, context, goals and scope of the project, involved ex-
ternal partners, relationships with other projects, projected re-
sults, projected budgets, business case and project risks. The
depth of information in the project initiation documents differed
per case: especially for larger and more risky projects, more
information is being stored.– Project plans: A document made in collaboration with project
partners. Compared to the project initiation documents, the
project plan also contains the division of responsibilities, costs
and beneﬁts between the partners, the overall project planning,
and anticipated meetings and reviews.
– Collaboration contract: For some cases, a collaboration contract
was found that states the mutual agreements between project
partners. Such contracts formally deﬁne the goal of the project
and the division of responsibilities, costs and beneﬁts between
partners. The collaboration contracts also detail IPR procedures
in the project and describe how the collaboration can be
terminated.
– Progress reports: For 16 cases, progress reports were found.
Progress reports evaluate on a monthly basis whether the pro-
ject meets the planning, budgeting and scope of the project. The
reports also describe whether project risks are acceptable, re-
sources being available and quality conditions are being met.
The progress reports also describe the most important problems
as well as milestones that have been achieved.
As a third source of data, seven semi-structured interviews
were conducted with informants from the grid operator. Although
the internal documentation described above provided rich and
extensive insights, interviews were conducted to probe deeper
into more subtle issues of governance and collective action. The
interviews thus aimed to corroborate and complement the ﬁnd-
ings from the documentation. Interviewees were selected by a
primary informant working at the grid operator, based on the list
of 34 analyzed projects. All prospective interviewees agreed to
participate. All interviews were recorded and interview reports
were created and fed back to interviewees for validation. See Ta-
ble 1 for overview.
3.4. Measurement instrument
A qualitative coding protocol was deﬁned that speciﬁes the
theoretical concepts from Section 2. For the relational and trans-
actional governance concepts, we focused on technology devel-
opment since this occurs in most of the cases (see Section 3.2). At
the extreme form, transactional governance refers to acquiring
technology or subcontracting a predeﬁned standardized task to a
third party. An example would be acquiring a smart meter from a
device manufacturer. The extreme form of relational governance
involves fully open-ended, long-term collaboration aimed at
jointly developing and owning the technology. An example would
be jointly developing a dynamic pricing system with an energy
provider. Regarding reputational selective incentives, the measure
focused on the participation of reputable partners in the project.
Table 2
Operationalization of measurement instrument.
Theoretical concept Operationalization Scale
Transactional governance Does the grid operator buy technology, systems or other components from the other party/parties? No / To some extent /
Yes
Relational governance Are systems or technologies developed jointly? No / To some extent /
Yes
Selective incentives: Financial Does the project involve selective material incentives (e.g. subsidies or venture capital)? Yes/No
Selective incentives: Reputation Does the project involve collaboration with able and visible partners? Yes/No
Selective incentives: Technologies Does the project involve facilitating technologies for third parties (e.g. offering open application pro-
gramming interfaces on technologies platforms)?
Yes/No
Selective incentives: IPR policies Does the project involve IPR policies to stimulate innovation by third parties? Yes/No
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on the reputation of the other partners in the project.
This qualitative open-ended protocol was pretested on ten
cases by two coders. After reﬁning the protocol using the ten cases,
a quantitative closed protocol was deﬁned to analyse all cases. An
overview of the relevant codes is given in Table 2.
Quantitative coding was executed by two coders in order to
increase reliability. Prior to coding a case, both coders jointly
collected and shared documents and relevant interview excerpts,
to ensure coding was done using the same data points. Next, the
two coders independently read the information and ﬁlled out the
protocol. Generally, each coder went over the case material twice
to assign the coding. Only after all cases were coded, the results
were compared across the coders, using intercoder reliability
metrics. For each variable, percent agreement and Cohen's Kappa
were computed, as the latter corrects percent agreement for
chance (Cohen, 1960). Intercoder reliability can be found in Ta-
ble 3, showing acceptable levels of both metrics.4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Before testing the hypotheses, we ﬁrst explore the results in a
descriptive manner. We illustrate the descriptive statistics derived
from the case database with the main qualitative ﬁndings from the
interviews.
We ﬁnd that transactional governance is the prominent me-
chanism in 47% of the cases, while relational governance is present
in 53% of the cases. This pattern is corroborated in the interviews,
as interviewees explain that several innovation projects are
maintained through transaction-oriented buyer-supplier relation-
ships. Interviewees argue that such transactional relations often
lead to lack of mutual understanding and trust between the grid
operator and other organizations. Interviewees also argue that a
transactional focus typically leads to strict planning of activities,







Transactional governance 85.3 0.69 0.000
Relational governance 76.5 0.51 0.001









85.3 0.70 0.000and processes cannot be fully foreseen up-front.
The most prominent incentives found in the cases are tech-
nology-related (73.5%) selective incentives. In the qualitative in-
terviews, various interviewees explained that other organizations
often collaborate with Alliander because they need to access the
energy grid for developing smart grid innovations. Another pro-
minent incentive is related to reputational beneﬁts (61.8%). Our
interviewees explained that Alliander's strong brand and ﬁnancial
solvency are important reasons for other organizations to colla-
borate. The strong reputation of the grid operator is especially
important incentives for knowledge institutes. Financial selective
incentives were present in half the cases (50.0%). Several inter-
viewees argued that other organizations often collaborate with
Alliander in order to receive ﬁnancial investments for their in-
novation projects, either directly from the grid operator or through
joint grant proposals to the European or national government. On
the other hand, interviewees argued that ﬁnancial incentives are
rarely a sufﬁcient reason to start collaborating and that the im-
portance of ﬁnancial incentives differs between public and private
organizations. IPR-related selective incentives were least promi-
nent (41.2%), and they are mostly present in larger or externally
funded projects. Our interviewees explained that they are not used
to dealing with IPR. In practice, IPR is often hardly being dealt
with. One interviewee shared an anecdote in which the grid op-
erator had to license-in a technological innovation that was de-
veloped in a project in which they had invested in themselves.
Interviewees provided several reasons for not handling IPR prop-
erly, for instance lacking expertise, high costs of maintaining IPR or
unwillingness to formalize agreements in general. Others provided
more strategic reasons for not handling IPR, arguing that IPR
should not be a main interest for a public organization and be
retained by commercial partners.
The selective incentives are not fully independent. Selective
incentives related to reputation often appear in the same cases
with selective incentives related to technology (χ2(1)¼8.10,
p¼0.007)) and IPR policies (χ2(1)¼5.78, p¼0.018). Apparently,
non-ﬁnancial selective incentives are more likely to be present
jointly or not at all in the cases.
4.2. Hypotheses testing
We test the hypotheses by evaluating the association between
collective action incentives and governance forms. Table 4 pre-
sents the results of chi-square tests on the associations.
Regarding selective incentives, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial selective
incentives are not associated with either of the relationship types.
Therefore, we conclude that:
H1: Financial selective incentives are most likely to be found in
projects relying on transactional governance– NOT SUPPORTED
Selective incentives related to reputation of project participants
are associated positively with relational governance (χ2(2)¼
Table 4
Interaction effects between governance and selective incentives for collective action.
Selective incentives:
Financial
Selective incentives: Reputation Selective incentives: Technologies Selective incentives: IPR policies
Transactional n.s.a n.s. Negative association (χ2(2)¼6.00,
p¼0.050))
n.s.
Relational n.s. Positive association (χ2(2)¼7.96,
p¼0.019))
n.s. Positive association (χ2(1)¼6.29,
p¼0.043))
a n.s. ¼ non-signiﬁcant association.
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H2: Reputation-related selective incentives are most likely to be
found in projects relying on relational governance – SUPPORTED
For technology-related selective incentives, we expected that
they would be mostly present in projects relying on relational
governance. We ﬁnd, however, that these types of incentives are
not signiﬁcantly associated to relational governance. Technol-
ogy-selective incentives are negatively associated to transac-
tional governance (χ2(2)¼6.00, p¼0.050)). Apparently, even
though technology-related selective incentives are not more
common in relationally governed projects, engaging in trans-
actional governance has a negative effect. As such, we ﬁnd the
hypothesis not supported.
H3: Technology-related selective incentives are most likely to be
found in projects relying on relational governance – NOT SUP-
PORTED
Selective incentives related to favourable IPR policies are more
common in projects governed through relational governance
(χ2(2)¼6.29, p¼0.043)). Therefore, we conclude that:
H4: IPR-related selective incentives are most likely to be found in
projects relying on relational governance – SUPPORTED5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper explored how smart grid projects are governed by
grid operators, and how this affects collective action with other
actors. We found that selective incentives that promote collective
action are more likely to be found in projects relying on relational
than on transactional governance. Speciﬁcally, in projects where
technologies are developed jointly in a long-term relationship, it is
more common to ﬁnd incentives related to reputational beneﬁts
and shared intellectual property rights. Financial incentives such
as fees or subsidies are similarly common in transactional and
relational governed projects. Technological incentives were not
associated to relationally governed projects. We did ﬁnd that
technological incentives were less present in transactional gov-
erned projects. As such, although our hypothesis was not sup-
ported, technological incentives are at least not found in one-off
deals.
A limitation of this paper is that we did not measure the ulti-
mate success of innovation projects. While we set out to collect
such performance metrics, the case information proved in-
sufﬁcient to reach reliable conclusions. However, collective action
theory does stipulate that the selective incentives included in our
study ultimately have a positive effect on project performance.
Moreover, from an innovation perspective, ﬁnancial performance
is not the only relevant criterion since also lessons learned are
relevant, and since the ultimate success can involve different as-
pects from the different partners. Another limitation is that we
only interviewed Alliander representatives rather than their
partners. However, in our primary data source of project man-
agement documents, input from partners is taken into account. As
such, the analysis does cover the perceptions of the project part-
ners to some extent.As the analysis has been done on the project portfolio of one
speciﬁc Dutch grid operator, internal validity is high as disturbing
effects of institutional and market conditions are limited. On the
other hand, generalization to other settings should be done with
care. Generalizability is difﬁcult to assess since benchmarks on
grid operators, nationally and internationally, only focus on con-
tinuity of supply, voltage quality and commercial quality (CEER,
2012). Since benchmarks indicate performance of Dutch grid op-
erators is similar, one might argue that the patterns will be similar.
However, innovation capacity, collaboration modes and selective
incentives for project partners are not included in benchmarks or
comparison studies.
Our ﬁndings contribute to policy-making in the area of smart
grids. Innovations in the energy domain increasingly require or-
ganizations to collaborate with others. As our case analysis shows,
such collaboration often extends beyond the boundaries of the
energy industry as technology providers and even citizen asso-
ciations are often involved. Our informal discussions with grid
operators in the Netherlands indicate that they face a challenge on
how to deal with those other actors during the course of innova-
tion projects. While grid operators have been used to dominate
interactions with other actors through price-based one-off trans-
actions, grid operators increasingly consider long-term partner-
ships to achieve their objectives. Our ﬁndings show that such a
shift from transactional to relational governance signiﬁcantly af-
fects selective incentives for collective action. More speciﬁcally,
our ﬁndings support the idea that grid operators may not just offer
ﬁnancial incentives through one-off transactions but provide more
intangible types of beneﬁts in long-term relationships. When joint
development is done with a long-term horizon, non-ﬁnancial in-
centives for collaboration such as sharing intellectual property
rights or reputational beneﬁts play an important role. The ﬁndings
also suggest that, within such projects relying on relational gov-
ernance, grid operators should consider a broader range of in-
centives beyond the mere ﬁnancially driven ones.
For policy makers, our ﬁndings show how a move from trans-
actional to relational governance can produce positive effects for
smart grid innovation projects. In the Netherlands, regulation does
not strictly prohibit the shift in collaboration modus. However, the
societal trend towards price-driven, elaborate tendering proce-
dures may hinder the move towards relational governance. A
helpful development might be the recently announced new vision
on subcontracting between government agencies and construction
sector stipulates transparency, shared goals, shared risks and re-
warding of learnings from projects (Schultz van Haegen, 2016). We
recommend that policy makers further stimulate relational ways
of innovation for smart grids, for instance by steering the public
debate.
For innovation policy making, the ﬁndings are relevant since
smart grid innovation projects are often subsidized by national or
regional governments. Typically, such subsidies are given to con-
sortia of organizations that work in a networked project setting. In
terms of the conceptualization employed in this paper, such sub-
sidies are a form of ﬁnancial selective incentives that may stimu-
late collective action between actors. However, our ﬁndings
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term relationship, other selective incentives are created as well.
Partners beneﬁt from sharing intellectual property rights over the
inventions produced in the project as well as from the reputation
of working together with a large grid operator. As such, policy
makers should consider how to optimize the conditions for such
non-ﬁnancial selective incentives rather than merely offering
subsidies. For instance, requiring joint IPR arrangements where
both grid operators and other parties beneﬁt and stimulating
dissemination about high-proﬁle projects may be just as effective
to convince organizations to work on smart grid projects. Policy
makers that wish to stimulate smart grid innovation projects
should consider stimulating long-term relationships between grid
operators and third parties, because such relationships are more
likely to produce incentives for collaboration.
Finally, we provide a policy recommendation by reﬂecting on
the lack of benchmarking information for our study. Grid operators
are still largely benchmarked and evaluated based on their op-
erational performance, i.e. continuity of supply, voltage quality and
customer interaction (CEER, 2012). As grid operators have a re-
sponsibility to support or even drive the transition towards smart
grids and renewables, we argue that other performance criteria
should be added. Modes of collaboration, innovation impacts and
selective incentives for third parties to engage in smart grid in-
novation should be added as performance and benchmarking
criteria. Our measurement instrument may be a starting point for
such benchmarking instrument, as this paper has shown it can
reliably measure selective incentives even if only based on for-
mally documented project information.Acknowledgments
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